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Framing Effects and the Selection of IS Design Alternatives
Michael R. Fish
Stern School of Business - New York University
email: mfish@stern.nyu.edu
Introduction
Studies focusing on designer cognition constitute a well-developed
stream of research in the field of information systems (IS). This line
of research has yielded valuable insights into the cognitive mechanisms
used by IS designers to elicit requirements, decompose and restructure
problems, and formulate and evaluate potential designs (Malhotra et.
al., 1980; Jeffries et. al., 1980; Turner, 1983; Vitalari and Dickson,
1983). One area that has received relatively little attention within
this stream of research is the cognitive bias displayed by IS designers
when making judgments under uncertainty (Stacy and Macmillian, 1995).
The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether the framing of
design alternatives systematically biases the risk preferences of IS
designers.
Research Problem
Theoretical Frameworks for Decision-Making Under Uncertainty
A frequently studied topic in decision theory is the manner in which an individual decision-maker accounts
for uncertain outcomes (Coombs et. al., 1970; Watson and Buede, 1987). One of the most prominent
theories for decision-making under risk is the expected utility model (Von Neumann and Morgenstern,
1947; Savage, 1954). This normative model is based on the assumption that a decision-maker can specify a
utility function based on a consistent, well-ordered set of preferences for decision outcomes. When making
decisions under uncertainty, a rational decision-maker will select the alternative that offers the highest
expected utility.
One utility function that is of particular interest in many decision-making situations is an individual's
utility-of-wealth function. The widely embraced decreasing marginal utility hypothesis contends that most
individuals exhibit a concave utility-of-wealth function. The essence of this hypothesis is that the concave
shape of the utility function leads an individual to refuse all fair gambles. Thus, the individual will exhibit
an aversion to risk for decisions made under uncertainty.
A number of researchers have questioned the tenability of expected utility theory as the foundation for a
descriptive theory of decision-making under risk. Tversky and Kahneman (1979, 1981) have proposed an
alternative model of decision-making under uncertainty which they have termed "prospect theory".
Prospect theory can be viewed as a modification of expected utility theory in which the utility function for
decision outcomes is replaced by a value function. A typical individual's value function for wealth is
defined relative to a neutral reference point, such as the individual's current asset position (Thaler, 1980).
Positive deviations from the reference position are termed gains, and negative deviations are termed losses.
The value function for gains is concave and relatively flat, whereas the value function for losses is convex
and relatively steep. As a result, individuals will tend to be moderately risk averse when faced with a gain,
and strongly risk seeking when faced with a loss. Note that prospect theory's prediction of risk preference
directly contradicts the decreasing marginal utility hypothesis.
The Selection of Information Systems Design Alternatives

In IS development projects, the relationship between clients and designers can be characterized as a
principal-agent relationship. An agency theory perspective would suggest that designers' decisions are
motivated by their own self-interests rather than by the interests of their clients (Jensen and Meckling,
1976; Gurbaxani and Whang, 1991). For example, designers may be more concerned with building an
empire or experimenting with new technology than with selecting the most cost-effective design solution
for their clients.
To protect against this contingency, clients may impose such administrative controls as performance-based
compensation plans for designers or competitive bidding practices for IS development projects (Kambil and
Turner, 1993; Cash et. al., 1992). Ostensibly, the purpose of these controls is to encourage designers' to
pursue design solutions that are aligned with the clients' objectives. However, these controls may also affect
the risk preferences of designers in subtle, unintended ways. More specifically, these controls may frame
circumstances surrounding a development project as gains or losses, thereby systematically biasing
designers' risk preferences as suggested by prospect theory. This argument suggests two hypotheses that are
investigated in this study:
Hypothesis 1: When administrative controls frame project circumstances as gains, IS designers will
moderately prefer risk-averse design alternatives. When administrative controls frame project
circumstances as losses, IS designers will strongly prefer risk-seeking design alternatives.
Hypothesis 2: When a bidding event for IS development is framed as an opportunity for gain, designers
will submit bids that exceed expected development cost. When a bidding event for IS development is
framed as a threatened loss, designers will submit bids that are less than expected development cost.
Research Method and Results
The subjects in this study are systems engineers employed by a software development company in the
northeastern United States. In November 1993, study questionnaires were mailed to seventy-eight systems
engineers in the company. Responses were obtained from forty-three engineers, yielding a fifty-five percent
response rate.
The questionnaire focused on the framing effects resulting from two administrative controls: performancebased compensation plans for IS designers, and competitive bidding practices for IS development projects.
Two hypothetical IS design cases were created for each administrative control, one framed as an
opportunity for gain and the other framed as a threatened loss. The four resulting cases are summarized in
Table 1.
In each of these four cases, the subject was asked to choose between two design alternatives with equal
expected values for development cost and time. One alternative had certain outcomes (e.g., certain cost,
certain development time), and the other alternative had risky outcomes. In cases 3 and 4, the subjects were
also told that they were members of an organization's IS department, and they were asked to bid on a
development project requested by another department. The subjects were told that they were competing
against external vendors, and that a linear relationship existed between the bid price and the probability of
winning the bid.
Table 2 summarizes the results of an analysis of the selection of design alternatives using logistic
regression. In accordance with hypothesis 1, the subjects strongly preferred risky alternatives when faced
with losses and moderately preferred non-risky alternatives when faced with gains. This decision-making
tendency was independent of the type of administrative control used to create the framing, and of the
designer's experience level.
Table 3 summarizes the analysis of results for the bids. Case 3 was constructed such that the subject was
assured of a gain if he or she should so choose. As shown in Table 3, the subjects' average bid price was

significantly higher than expected cost, but still provided an eight-five percent chance of winning the bid.
These results support hypothesis 2.
In contrast, case 4 was framed as a loss. If the designer were to lose the bid in this case, layoffs would
occur in the IS department. Thus, the designer had an incentive to submit a low bid. However, a bid which
was too low would not cover the expected cost of development, and the IS department would have to draw
on slack organizational resources to cover the cost deficit. Note that the subjects could have submitted a bid
price equal to expected cost and still have had a sixty percent chance of winning. Instead, the threat of
layoffs compelled the subjects to submit an average bid price that was significantly lower than expected
cost in order to improve their chance of winning the bid to seventy-eight percent. These results also support
hypothesis 2.
Discussion and Implications
Organizations are becoming increasingly aware of the need to manage both the costs and risks associated
with IS development projects. In response to this need, researchers have proposed numerous administrative
controls (Kambil and Turner, 1993; Cash et. al., 1992). However, previous research has not articulated the
possible decision framing consequences that may arise from these controls. Perhaps this is because decision
framing is a subtle and largely unnoticed phenomenon (Tversky and Kahneman, 1981). To successfully
manage development risks, however, organizations need to understand how their administrative controls
can lead to framing effects which systematically influence the risk preferences of IS designers.
References available upon request from the author..
TYPE OF ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROL

TYPE OF FRAMING

COMPENSATION PLAN
FOR IS DESIGNERS

COMPETITIVE BIDDING
PRACTICE

GAIN

CASE 1 - receive a bonus for CASE 3 - opportunity for IS
exceeding IS design
department to win the bid for
objectives
a profitable project

CASE 4 - layoffs are
threatened if IS department
LOSS
loses bid for a non-profitable
project
Table 1 - Summary of Cases Used in Questionnaire
ESTIMATES FROM THE LOGISTIC REGRESSION MODEL
CASE 2 - forfeit a portion of
compensation for failing to
meet IS design objectives

PREDICTOR VARIABLES

STANDARD ERROR OF
ESTIMATE

PARAMETER ESTIMATES*
b0 = 1.1761**

CONSTANT

0.3703

***

FRAME

b1 = -1.2635

CONTROL

b2 = 0.0237

0.3436
0.4028

EXPERIENCE

b3 = -0.0062

0.0189

*

df = 239; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001

TYPE OF FRAMING

ESTIMATED PROBABILITY OF SELECTING RISKY DESIGN

.

GAIN

0.46

.

LOSS

.
Table 2 - Analysis of the Selection of Design Alternatives
0.74

TYPE OF FRAMING
.

GAIN (CASE 3)*

LOSS (CASE 4)**

EXPECTED COST OF DESIGN
ALTERNATIVES

$ 450,000

$ 1,700,000

MEAN OF BID PRICE

$ 536,800

$ 1,608,000

STANDARD DEVIATION OF BID PRICE

$ 51,400

$ 141,300

TEST OF BID PRICE VS. EXPECTED COST

PRICE > COST

PRICE < COST***

MEAN CHANCE OF WINNING BID

0.85

0.78

% OF RESPONDENTS SELECTING RISKY
DESIGN ALTERNATIVE

0.51

0.67

*

***

n = 39; **n = 40; ***p < 0.001
Table 3 - Summary of Bid Results

